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Chapter 1 What is life?   
Carol Cleland & Michael Zerella 
Distinguishing life from non-life has challenged philosophers at least since Aristotle. In recent years it has 
taken on increasing scientific importance as researchers seek to understand the origins and extent of life 
in the universe and explore the possibilities for artificial forms of life. Yet despite spectacular advances in 
the biological sciences, especially over the last half-century, no consensus among scientists or 
philosophers has emerged on what life is. In this chapter we describe how this lack of consensus impacts 
some areas of scientific research, and we discuss what this can teach students about science as a process of 
discovery. We argue that scientists are not yet in a position to formulate a complete let alone final 
account of the nature of life, and that for this reason establishing a definition of life can do more harm 
than good. In order to provide a scientifically compelling answer to the question “what is life?” 
researchers need access to novel forms of life, and their search should not be constrained by our limited 
experience with life as we know it on Earth today. In addition to providing an interesting way to present 
a variety of recent biological discoveries, exploration of these issues is useful in biology education because 
it demonstrates why science is a fundamentally open-ended and ongoing process of inquiry rather than 
just a static set of facts and dogmatic principles.  
 
Chapter 2 Biological Explanation   
Angela Potochnik 
One of the central aims of science is explanation: scientists seek to uncover why things happen the way 
they do.  This chapter addresses what kinds of explanations are formulated in biology, how explanatory 
aims influence other features of the field of biology, and the implications of all of this for biology 
education.  Philosophical treatments of scientific explanation have been both complicated and enriched 
by attention to explanatory strategies in biology.  Most basically, whereas traditional philosophy of 
science based explanation on derivation from scientific laws, there are many biological explanations in 
which laws play little or no role.  Instead, the field of biology is a natural place to turn for support for the 
idea that causal information is explanatory.  Biology has also been used to motivate mechanistic accounts 
of explanation, as well as criticisms of that approach.  Ultimately, the most pressing issue about 
explanation in biology may be how to account for the wide range of explanatory styles encountered in 
the field.  This issue is crucial, for the aims of biological explanation influence a variety of other features 
of the field of biology.  Explanatory aims account for the continued neglect of some central causal factors, 
a neglect that would otherwise be mysterious.  This is linked to the persistent use of models like 
evolutionary game theory and population genetic models, models that are simplified to the point of 
unreality.  These explanatory aims also offer a way to interpret many biologists’ total commitment to one 
or another methodological approach, and the intense disagreements that result.  In my view, such debates 
are better understood as arising not from different theoretical commitments, but commitments to 
different explanatory projects.  Biology education would thus be enriched by attending to approaches to 
biological explanation, as well as the unexpected ways that these explanatory aims influence other 
features of biology.  I suggest five lessons for teaching about explanation in biology that follow from the 
considerations of this chapter.   
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Chapter 3 What would Natural Laws in the Life Sciences be?   
Marc Lange 
Much research in the life sciences arrives at generalizations concerning the biological properties 
characteristic of particular species, or generalizations concerning groups of species or even generalizations 
concerning broader biological classes. How should we understand these generalizations? In this chapter, I 
will examine whether the concept of a law of nature can help us to understand them. I will examine 
several controversies about the applicability of the concept of a natural law to the life sciences, including 
whether biological generalizations have exceptions, are riddled with ceteris-paribus provisos, or are too 
historically contingent to qualify as distinctively biological laws. I will not aim to argue that there are in 
fact biological laws, but rather to understand what would make it the case that there are (or are not). 
Implications for science education are discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 The Nature of Evolutionary Biology: at the Borderlands between Historical and Experimental 
Science   
Massimo Pigliucci 
For some time now both biologists and philosophers of science have been struggling with the nature of 
evolutionary biology as a discipline. On the one hand, and dating back to Ronald Fisher’s fundamental 
theorem of natural selection, the claim is that evolutionary biology is a predictive science based on 
rigorous mathematical foundations — indeed, Fisher consciously styled his theorem after the second 
principle of thermodynamics in physics, the (presumed) queen of sciences. On the other hand, Fisher’s 
historical antagonist, Sewall Wright, emphasized the role of chance events (random drift) in countering 
and sometimes thwarting natural selection. The debate became central to Stephen Gould’s attempt in the 
1980s to establish paleontology, the quintessential historical science within biology, as a “nomothetic” 
(i.e., aiming at the discovery of general laws) enterprise, while at the same time acknowledging the 
macroevolutionary import of chance events like the asteroidal impact that caused the extinction of so 
many species at the end of the Cretaceous. In this chapter I will deploy a novel philosophical analysis by 
Carol Cleland and examine recent experimental results on the replicability of evolutionary trajectories, to 
clarify the status of evolutionary biology as a discipline and that of the relative role of what Jacques 
Monod referred to as chance and necessity in biological explanations. 
 
Chapter 5 Evolutionary Theory and the Epistemology of Science  
Kevin McCain & Brad Weslake 
The sciences offer us a detailed picture of the world in which we live. But why is it rational to accept this 
picture? Evolutionary theory provides a beautiful case study of the way in which scientific theories are 
supported by their evidence. In this paper we provide a guide for teachers who wish to use evolutionary 
theory to explain the way in which scientific theories are supported, and to explain what is required for a 
theory to be rationally accepted.  Our method is to consider evolutionary theory in the light of a range of 
criticisms that have been made by its critics: that it is a theory rather than a fact, that it cannot be proven, 
that it is not falsifiable, that it has been falsified, and that it does not make predictions.  Using a series of 
examples, we explain why these criticisms are either false or involve a misunderstanding of the nature of 
evidential support and scientific knowledge.  In the process, we exhibit some of the epistemic principles 
that are at the heart of scientific inference, and show how they are employed to establish the rational 
acceptability of evolution. 
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Chapter 6 Conceptual Change and the Rhetoric of Evolutionary Theory: ‘Force Talk’ as a Case study and 
Challenge for Science Pedagogy  
David Depew 
Darwinian theories vary.  Some of the variation consists in differences in conceptual frames.  These 
identify the entities and processes over which natural selection ranges.  Different conceptual schemes are 
most easily identifiable by the different images, similes, analogies, and metaphors—in general, tropes--by 
which evolutionary theories are brought to bear on particulars.  I show how Darwin’s metaphors 
balanced function, chance, and determinism in living things by seeing artificial selection in terms of 
natural forces and natural forces in terms of artificial selection.  I then argue that the Modern 
Evolutionary Synthesis highlighted Darwin’s view of natural selection as a creative process, which earlier 
Darwinians had abandoned, by shifting to a conceptual framework and family of tropes that made images 
of force and design recessive.  With the use of mathematical game theory to model gene frequency 
changes in the l970s, however, design and force metaphors became dominant again, with the predictable 
result that images of Darwinism as promoting a god-abandoned, dog-eat-dog that had lodged deeply in 
popular culture long ago, were reawakened.  Analysis of evolutionary discourse that hopes to reach 
students and the public must attend closely to the uses and abuses of conceptual tropes, ‘force’ and 
‘design’ among them.  This poses a question for pedagogy.  How well can one teach evolutionary science 
without teaching some of its conceptual, and hence its rhetorical, history?  Will students perceive this 
history as enhancing their knowledge of evolution, as an irrelevant waste of time, or, in its contentious 
diversity, as undermining its scientific status? Answering this question calls for empirical research.  
 
Chapter 7 Debating the Power and Scope of Adaptation   
Patrick Forber 
How often should we invoke adaptation to explain the features of the biological world?  Ideally, just as 
often as a history of natural selection explains the form and function of those features.  This is partly an 
empirical question about evolutionary history.  But it is also partly a question about the methods we 
should use to investigate evolutionary history.  And the answers to the question have consequences for 
our views about our place in the biological world.  Controversy over these issues is at least as old as 
Darwin.  In contemporary evolutionary biology this controversy continues as the debate over 
adaptationism, raising a number of deep issues about the science of evolutionary biology and our 
philosophical understanding of the science.  This makes adaptationism particularly relevant to science 
education, for the controversy provides traction on large scale questions about the nature of evidence and 
explanation, the plurality of scientific methods, and how science should guide our views about our 
biological nature.  In this chapter I will investigate some of the issues about evidence and methodology 
brought out by the controversy, and I will argue that the debate over adaptationism provides an excellent 
and informative example of science in action.  This is more than a mere philosophical controversy, for it 
interacts with the practice of biology in fascinating and complex ways. 
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Chapter 8 Biology and Religion: The Case for Evolution  
Francisco Ayala 
The theory of biological evolution is the central organizing principle of modern biology. In 1973, the 
eminent evolutionist Theodosius Dobzhansky famously asserted that “Nothing in biology makes sense 
except in the light of evolution.” Evolution provides a scientific explanation for why there are so many 
different kinds of organisms on Earth and gives an account of their similarities and differences 
(morphological, physiological, and genetic). Science has demonstrated again and again, beyond reasonable 
doubt, that living organisms evolve and diversify over time, and that their features have come about by 
natural selection, a process that accounts for their design. Yet, there are many people of faith in the 
United States and elsewhere who think that science, particularly the theory of evolution, is contrary to 
the teachings of the Bible and to religious beliefs, such as creation by God. Well before the formulation of 
the theory of evolution, religious authors over the centuries used the “argument-from-design” to 
demonstrate rationally, without reference to faith or divine revelation, the existence of God, as the author 
of the design of organisms. The argument from design has two parts. In one familiar form it asserts, first, 
that organisms evince to have been designed; second, that only God could account for the design. The 
argument from design was advanced, in a variety of forms, in Classical Greece and early Christianity. Its 
most extensive formulation is due to William Paley in his Natural Theology (1802). The eye—as well as 
all sorts of organs, organisms, and their interactions—manifests to be the outcome of design and not of 
chance, thus it shows to have been created by God. In the 1990s, the design argument was revived in the 
United States by several authors. The flagellum used by bacteria for swimming and the immune system of 
mammals, as well as some improbability calculations, were advanced as evidence of “intelligent design,” 
on the grounds that chance processes could not account for the phenomena to be explained. In The 
Origin of Species, Darwin (1859) advanced a scientific explanation of the design of organisms. The 
adaptations of organisms are outcomes not of chance, but of a process that, over time, causes the gradual 
accumulation of features beneficial to organisms, whenever these features increase the organisms’ chances 
of surviving and reproducing. There is design in the living world: eyes are designed for seeing, wings for 
flying, and kidneys for regulating the composition of the blood. The design of organisms comes about not 
by intelligent design, but by a natural process, which is creative through the interaction of chance and 
necessity. Organisms are pervaded by imperfections, dysfunctions, cruelties, and even sadism. The theory 
of evolution accounts for these mishaps by natural selection, as outcomes of natural processes, so that they 
need not be attributed to God’s explicit design. The theory of evolution perceived by some people of faith 
as contrary to religion, may thus be acknowledged as their “disguised friend.” The theory of evolution 
accounts for the design of organisms, but also for the dysfunctions, oddities, cruelty, and sadism that 
pervade the world of life, so that these deficiencies need not be attributed to specific agency by the 
Creator, which might implicitly amount to blasphemy. The foregoing considerations are important both 
for understanding and for accepting evolution as a fact of life, and should be taken into account by 
science educators and teachers. 
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Chapter 9 The Implications of Evolutionary Biology for Religious Belief   
Denis Alexander 
Evolutionary biology developed as a discipline within cultures influenced by the Christian faith and it 
was therefore with this religion that the initial exchange of ideas occurred. This chapter introduces some 
of the general models that have been proposed to describe the relationship between science and religion 
and then relates these to the particular engagement of Christianity with the theory of evolution. The 
important distinction between methodological and ontological reductionism is discussed within the 
context of this engagement. The chapter highlights four disparate issues that are particularly relevant 
when considering the implications of evolutionary biology for religious belief: biblical hermeneutics, the 
theological understanding of the term ‘creation’, the role of chance, and the implications of evolution for 
morality. It is concluded that the historical emergence of the contemporary scientific enterprise from a 
theological matrix generates many positive resonances between science and faith, and that, consequently, 
the biological research community is where a believer should feel particularly at home.    
 
Chapter 10 Intelligent Design and the Nature of Science: Philosophical and Pedagogical Points  
Ingo Brigandt 
This chapter offers a critique of intelligent design arguments against evolution and a philosophical 
discussion of the nature of science, drawing several lessons for the teaching of evolution and for science 
education in general. I discuss why Behe’s irreducible complexity argument fails, and why his portrayal of 
organismal systems as machines is detrimental to biology education and any understanding of how 
organismal evolution is possible. The idea that the evolution of complex organismal features is too 
unlikely to have occurred by random mutation and selection (as recently promoted by Dembski) is very 
widespread, but it is easy to show students why such small probability arguments are fallacious. While 
intelligent design proponents have claimed that the exclusion of supernatural causes mandated by 
scientific methods is dogmatically presupposed by science, scientists have an empirical justification for 
using such methods. This justification is instructive for my discussion of how to demarcate science from 
pseudoscience. I argue that there is no universal account of the nature of science, but that the criteria 
used to judge an intellectual approach vary across historical periods and have to be specific to the 
scientific domain. Moreover, intellectual approaches have to be construed as practices based on 
institutional factors and values, and to be evaluated in terms of the activities of their practitioners. Science 
educators should not just teach scientific facts, but present science as a practice and make students reflect 
on the nature of science, as this gives them a better appreciation of the ways in which intelligent design 
falls short of actual science. 
 
Chapter 11 Molecular Evolution  
Michael Dietrich 
Molecular evolution emerged as a new hybrid discipline in the 1960s.  Since then the study of the 
evolution of proteins, RNA, and DNA has profoundly altered the study of evolutionary biology. Any 
evolutionary biologist who witnessed the rise of molecular evolution can attest to this change.  
Philosophical analysis, however, allows us to sharpen our understanding of the nature of that change and 
in doing so appreciate that molecular evolution has split the domain of evolutionary phenomena, 
diversified the leading causes of evolutionary change, and produced a profound methodological reversal 
with regard to the testing of evolutionary hypotheses.  In a post-genomic era, biology educators face a 
challenge of explaining evolution at both the molecular and organismal level.  Philosophical analysis can 
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clarify what makes these distinct but complementary approaches to evolution, while biologists 
themselves seek ways to integrate the molecular and organismal in evolutionary biology. 
 
Chapter 12 Educational Lessons from Evolutionary Properties of the Sexual Genome  
John Avise 
The sexual genome (the full suite of genetic material within each cell of a sexual species) is an object of 
wonder for scientists and philosophers alike.  By any criterion, it ranks among the most complex and 
sophisticated apparatuses known to humanity, yet it also performs like a Rube-Goldberg device that 
malfunctions routinely with oft-disastrous consequences for an organism's wellbeing.  To reconcile such 
seemingly contradictory perspectives on genomic operations, gene-centric reasoning that focuses on the 
concept of selfish DNA appears at present to be a fruitful scientific approach.  The basic idea is that 
sequence proliferation via successful DNA replication is a key aspect of the evolutionary game especially 
when the best interests of genes versus organisms come into conflict, as they often do.  From this neo-
Darwinian insight flow biological predictions that reconcile otherwise enigmatic structural and 
functional properties of sexual genomes, including many recently uncovered features of nuclear DNA in 
Homo sapiens.  Thus, we might suppose that molecular genetics and evolutionary genomics would be 
centerpieces of academic curricula in biology and medicine.  The fact that they are not has historical and 
sociological roots that help to explain why the genomic revolution, now entering its second decade, has 
barely begun to reach its tremendous potential for illuminating the human condition.  
 
Chapter 13 Non-genetic Inheritance and Evolution  
Tobias Uller 
Teaching evolution usually means an exclusive focus on transmission genetics as the basis for heredity. 
The stability of DNA sequences gives the impression that the developmental history of individuals can be 
set aside and evolutionary change in phenotypes can be described as change in gene frequencies. This is 
the textbook version of evolution and the view that the majority of evolutionary biologists subscribe to. 
The unique position of DNA in heredity is now being challenged, however. Mounting empirical evidence 
suggests that phenotypic stability within lineages and differences between lineages can originate and be 
maintained via epigenetic and behavioural mechanisms, even in the absence of genetic variation. This 
raises questions regarding the evolutionary implications of such non-genetic mechanisms of inheritance, 
including whether they can bias the rate and direction of evolution or allow inheritance of acquired 
characters. In this chapter, I outline the historical background to the development of the transmission 
genetics view of heredity and how recent findings in molecular, developmental, and behavioural biology 
challenge the textbooks. I continue by showing how the heterogeneous cluster of non-genetic 
mechanisms of inheritance can contribute to an expanded version of evolutionary theory. Although it 
turns out that the special role played by genes in evolution can also be played by other inheritance 
systems, the main conceptual advantage of recognizing non-genetic mechanisms of inheritance is that it 
stimulates an explicit consideration of developmental processes in evolutionary explanations. This helps 
us to connect the processes responsible for within-generation change (‘proximate questions’ or the 
domain of developmental biology) with among-generation change (‘ultimate question’ or the domain of 
evolutionary biology). Furthermore, it shows how the teaching of fundamental concepts in evolutionary 
biology can benefit from philosophical analysis informed by contemporary biological research. 
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Chapter 14 Homology  
Alessandro Minelli & Giuseppe Fusco 
Homology is the core concept of comparative biology. Or, better, a variegated flock of concepts about 
relationships between character states in different biological units, the latter being either modular parts of 
one biological individual or conspecific individuals differing either in sex or developmental stage or, more 
commonly, representative individuals of different species. The chapter includes a historical overview of 
the subject and a definitional characterization of the many concepts of homology proposed since Owen 
(1843), contrasting non-historical, historical and factorial notions of homology, followed by a detailed 
analysis of ‘sameness’ across evolutionary time, developmental time and body space. A special section 
presents a selection of fields of application of the concept, like phylogenetic inference, the study of 
evolutionary novelties, biological nomenclature and reconstruction of the ancestral taxa. The chapter 
terminates with some educational suggestions. 
 
Chapter 15 Teaching Evolutionary Developmental Biology: Concepts, Problems and Controversy  
Alan Love 
Although sciences are often conceptualized in terms of theory confirmation and hypothesis testing, an 
equally important dimension of scientific reasoning is the structure of problems that guide inquiry. This 
problem structure is evident in several concepts central to evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-
devo)—constraints, modularity, evolvability, and novelty. Because problems play an important role in 
biological practice, they should be included in biological pedagogy, especially when treating the issue of 
scientific controversy. A key feature of resolving controversy is synthesizing methodologies from 
different biological disciplines to generate empirically adequate explanations. Concentrating on problem 
structure illuminates this interdisciplinarity in a way that is often ignored when science is taught only 
from the perspective of theory or hypothesis. These philosophical considerations can assist life science 
educators in their continuing quest to teach biology to the next generation. 
 
Chapter 16 Philosophical Issues in Ecology  
James Justus 
Ecology endeavors to explain significant portions of the living world. The sophisticated experimental tests 
and mathematical theories developed to do so deserve much more attention from philosophers of science. 
This paper describes some of the main contours of the newly emerging field of philosophy of ecology: 
how an ecological perspective shaped Darwin’s theory, particularly the niche concept and the idea that 
there is a “balance of nature”; the character and metaphysical status of biological communities; whether 
there are laws of ecology; and the concept of ecological stability. As these topics illustrate, ecology 
concerns a diverse conceptual terrain and an interesting set of theoretical and methodological issues that 
provide rich grist for philosophy. 
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Chapter 17 Small Things, Big Consequences: Microbiological Perspectives on Biology 
Michael J. Duncan, Pierrick Bourrat, Jennifer DeBerardinis, & Maureen O’ Malley 
Microbiology is a broad-ranging area of research that has developed out of 400 years of observation, 
analysis and theorizing about microscopic life forms. The study of microbes has not yet received a great 
deal of attention from philosophy of biology, but there are many reasons why it should. In this chapter, 
we outline the value of thinking philosophically about microbes and microbiology via a discussion of 
concepts of life, biological individuals and levels of selection. These discussions will show how taking a 
philosophical perspective on microbiological studies can enrich not only microbiology but also biology in 
general and its philosophy. We conclude by drawing out some of the implications of philosophical 
perspectives on microbiology for educational strategies in the teaching of biology. 
 
Chapter 18 Essentialism in Biology  
John Wilkins 
Essentialism in philosophy is the position that things, especially kinds of things, have essences, or sets of 
properties, that all members of the kind must have, and the combination of which only members of the 
kind do, in fact, have. It is usually thought to derive from classical Greek philosophy and in particular 
from Aristotle’s notion of “what it is to be” something. In biology, it has been claimed that pre-
evolutionary views of living kinds, or as they are sometimes called, “natural kinds”, are essentialist. This 
static view of living things presumes that no transition is possible in time or form between kinds, and that 
variation is regarded as accidental or inessential noise rather than important information about taxa. In 
contrast it is held that Darwinian, and post-Darwinian, biology relies upon variation as important and 
inevitable properties of taxa, and that taxa are not, therefore, kinds but historical individuals. Recent 
attempts have been made to undercut this account, and to reinstitute essentialism in biological kind 
terms. Others argue that essentialism has not ever been a historical reality in biology and its predecessors. 
In this chapter, I shall outline the many meanings of the notion of essentialism in psychology and social 
science as well as science, and discuss pro- and anti-essentialist views, and some recent historical 
revisionism. It turns out that nobody was essentialist to speak of in the sense that is antievolutionary in 
biology, and that much confusion rests on treating the one word, “essence” as meaning a single notion 
when in fact there are many. I shall also discuss the philosophical implications of essentialism, and what 
that means one way or the other for evolutionary biology. Teaching about evolution relies upon 
narratives of change in the ways the living world is conceived by biologists. This is a core narrative issue. 
 
Chapter 19 Biological Teleology: the Need for History  
James Lennox & Kostas Kampourakis 
Teleology is a mode of explanation in which something is explained to be present because of its 
contribution to some end to which it contributes, and it has its roots in the philosophies of Plato and 
Aristotle. Aristotle defended a natural teleology, free of the Platonic idea that the natural world is the 
creation of a divine, rational being of some sort, with a plan for his creation.  The philosophical debate 
over teleological explanation in natural science during the Scientific Revolution was primarily between 
those who, under Platonic influence, defended theistic, creationist teleology and those who, for a wide 
variety of reasons, opposed the use of any sort of teleology in natural science, while the effective scientific 
use of Aristotelian teleological explanation was bearing fruit in the disciplines of anatomy, physiology and 
medicine. This analysis leads to a crucial distinction between two types of teleological explanations: a) 
teleological explanations based on design, which suggest that a feature exists for some purpose because it 
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was intentionally designed to fulfill it, and b) teleological explanations based on natural selection, which 
explain a feature’s presence in a population by suggesting that it was selected for its beneficial 
consequences for organism which have it. In this chapter, we describe a framework that can be 
implemented in order to help students be able to distinguish between design-teleology and selection-
teleology. In doing this, an interesting connection is revealed: two major types of explanations found in 
conceptual development literature, animism and creationism, are identified as different types of teleology. 
We conclude that the history of the place of teleological explanations in the scientific study of life is 
necessary for understanding the philosophical dispute over their place in the biological sciences today, as 
well as that reference to evolutionary history is necessary for challenging students’ intuitive teleological 
explanations.  
 
Chapter 20 Biology's Functional Perspective: Roles, Advantages and Organization  
Arno Wouters 
This chapter discusses biology’s functional perspective: what it amounts to, why it is essential and why it 
doesn’t assume teleology or design. Using an explanation of the penguin’s two-voice system as an 
example, I outline the main characteristics of the functional perspective: it approaches organisms as 
solutions to the problem to stay alive, it uses role functions to explain how organisms solve this problem, 
and explains an organism’s features by pointing to the advantages of these features in solving the 
problems of life. Next, I explain why this perspective pervades biology. An organism’s ability to stay alive 
critically depends not only on the characteristics of its parts but also on the arrangement of those parts 
and on the order and timing of their activities. The functional perspective is the biologist’s way to take 
this organization into account. Then, I clear up some ambiguities in the use of the terms ‘function’ and 
‘functional explanation’. I distinguish three notions of function (function as activity, function as biological 
role and function as biological value) and two kinds of functional explanation (explanations that use role 
functions to explain an organism’s ability to stay alive and explanations that explain why certain 
organisms have certain characteristics by elucidating why those characteristics are advantageous in 
solving the problem to stay alive). Subsequently, I point out that function attributions and functional 
explanations are independent from assumptions about origin. This distinguishes function from adaptation 
and functional explanation from selection explanation. I then explain that it is a misunderstanding to 
think that the functional perspective rests on an analogy between function and design. Finally, I discuss 
the idea that it is the ‘proper function’ of a part or behavior to produce the effects for which that part or 
behavior was maintained in the process of natural selection. I explain that, as long as one is aware that 
functions in this sense do not explain the presence or structure of their bearer, Darwinian evolutionary 
theory is not at odds with this leap from past to purpose, but does not justify it either.  
 
Chapter 21 Understanding Biological Mechanisms: Using Illustrations from Circadian Rhythm Research  
William Bechtel 
In many fields of biology, researchers explain a phenomenon by characterizing the responsible 
mechanism. This requires identifying the candidate mechanism, decomposing it into its parts and 
operations, recomposing it so as to understanding how it is organized and its operations orchestrated to 
generate the phenomenon, and situating it in its environment. Mechanistic researchers have developed 
sophisticated tools for decomposing mechanisms but new approaches, including modeling, are 
increasingly being invoked to recompose mechanisms when they involve nonsequential organization of 
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nonlinear operations. The results often are dynamical mechanistic explanations. The steps in mechanistic 
research are illustrated using research on circadian rhythms.  
 
Chapter 22 Information in the Biological Sciences  
Alfredo Marcos & Robert Arp 
Information has been a central concept for contemporary work in the biological sciences (and other 
sciences) especially after the publication of Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver’s, The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication, in 1949. In fact, the pervasiveness of Shannon’s information theory—as well 
as of the very terms themselves—becomes evident when one takes a moment to reflect upon just a few of 
the concepts that are standard in the biomedical sciences, such as genetic code, messenger RNA, ion 
channel, cell signaling, intracellular communication, signal transduction, pathogen transmission, positive 
feedback loop, expressive noise minimization, and many others. In this chapter we first give a historical 
introduction concerning the concept and nature of information, with a special emphasis upon the 
biological sciences. Then, we provide a few important examples of information at work in the biological 
sciences. Next, we consider the debate regarding the reality and nature of bioinformation, arguing that 
bioinformation is best understood as a relationship between and/or among entities; for instance, DNA is 
informational only in relation to a given cellular context, and it is misguiding to locate information in a 
particular molecule. We then go on to show how bioinformation relates to other concepts such as 
entropy, order, organization, complexity, and knowledge. Finally, we approach education itself as an 
informational process in order to draw some consequences for the teaching of biology. 
 
Chapter 23 Systems Biology and Education  
Pierre Alain Braillard 
According to most commentators, systems biology is transforming the biological sciences in many ways, 
although it is debatable exactly at what levels and to what extent. The formalization and use of 
computational models, the development of high-throughput experimental techniques, the new links with 
other scientific domains (like physics, engineering, mathematics, or computer sciences) and the transfers 
of explanatory models that have resulted, and other changes have had a profound impact on how 
biological research is conducted and, consequently, how biology must be taught. In this chapter, I will 
particularly focus on what challenges and opportunities the massive use of formal models has brought to 
biology. Not only must biologists learn how to use new tools in order to represent and analyze their 
objects of study, but they also have to realize that new questions must be asked in order to reveal aspects 
of biological systems that remained hidden in the framework of traditional molecular biology and 
genetics. Systems biology is integrative and interdisciplinary but transfers of methods, models and 
concepts are not straightforward and they raise many difficult questions. Another problem is that the 
transformation of biology into a "complex science" leads to a partial loss of intuitive understanding, which 
can be troubling for biologists, which are used to think with the help of words and diagrams. How can 
biologists regain some intelligibility? I will also discuss how systems biology has already started to 
challenge some of the standard views about the status of biology as a science, the nature of biological 
explanations, the relation between different domains of biology, or the nature of living systems and their 
evolution. I will argue that these philosophical analyses of systems biology's foundations must be seriously 
integrated in contemporary reflections on biology education. 
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Chapter 24 Putting Mendel in His Place: How Curriculum Reform in Genetics and Counterfactual 
History of Science Can Work Together 
Annie Jamieson & Gregory Radick 
Textbook presentations of genetics have changed remarkably little since their earliest days.  Typically an 
initial chapter introduces Mendel's pea-hybridization experiments and the lessons ("laws") drawn from 
them.  Then, in succeeding chapters, those lessons are gradually qualified and supplemented outof 
existence.  The case of dominance is an especially well-discussed example of a concept that has survived 
in genetics pedagogy despite its diminishing role in genetic theory and practice.  To clarify the costs of 
continuing to organize knowledge of heredity in traditionally Mendelian ways, this chapter recalls 
criticisms of Mendelism that were made at its start but have since been lost. The criticisms came from the 
Oxford zoologist W. F. R. Weldon (1860-1906).  Although remembered now as a "biometrician", Weldon 
was by training an embryologist, who toward the end of his life drew upon the latest experimental studies 
of animal development in order to suggest an alternative and, in his view, superior concept of dominance 
to that found in Mendel's work.  Weldon's dissent from Mendelism could well serve to inspire those 
attempting now to cast Mendelian tradition aside in order to reshape genetics teaching for a genomic age. 
 
Chapter  25 Against “Genes For”: Could an Inclusive Concept of Genetic Material Effectively Replace 
Gene Concepts?  
Richard Burian & Kostas Kampourakis 
This chapter focuses on the interactions between developmental, evolutionary, and genetic considerations 
in thinking about the structure and content of the genetic material and how it is regulated, with 
additional attention to the role of genetics in biomedical research. We suggest an approach to teaching 
non-professionals about genetics by paying attention to these issues and how they have been transformed 
by molecular tools and doctrines. Our main aim is to debunk the intuitive and widespread notion of 
“genes for”. This perspective should help students engage with the issues raised by contemporary 
biomedicine and biotechnology. We suggest that by replacing the concept of the gene as a vehicle for 
integrating developmental, evolutionary, and genetic considerations and for understanding the 
importance of genetics in biomedicine and biotechnology with the concept of the genetic material, 
questions about genes and about the genetic material become a tool for integrating knowledge of other 
biological sciences. In the process, one will be able to develop helpful arguments against overly-narrow 
versions of genetic determinism and for the importance of a broad understanding of genes and 
inheritance. 
 
Chapter 26 Current Thinking about Nature and Nurture  
David Moore 
Theories about the origins of people’s biological and psychological characteristics have focused for 
centuries on the contributions of Nature and Nurture to development. Modern psychologists often 
maintain that it is an error to ask if Nature or Nurture determines the form of a particular trait, because 
the two types of factors interact during development. Instead, some of them have argued, the question of 
importance is: how much does each factor contribute to this process? This is the approach adopted by 
quantitative behavioral geneticists engaged in twin and/or adoption studies—research designed to yield 
heritability estimates for a wide variety of traits. In contrast, molecular biologists have learned that the 
dichotomy at the heart of such questions does not stand up to either conceptual or empirical scrutiny. In 
fact, it makes little sense to attempt to quantify the extent to which Nature versus Nurture contributes to 
 13 
a trait, precisely because these two classes of factors are always essential to—and interactive during—the 
development of both biological and psychological characteristics. Therefore, the question of importance 
is: how are our traits built during development? That is, how is it that genetic factors, proteins, cells, 
organs, organisms, and populations of individuals co-act to produce phenotypes in development? There 
are a number of related insights at the center of this discussion, including that the environments and 
experiences we encounter as we develop get inside of us in ways that alter our biological/genetic 
functioning, and that biological factors collaborate with environmental factors to build all of our organs, 
including our brains and their associated behaviors, cognitions, and emotions. Although the 
conceptualization of Nature and Nurture as dichotomous has a long history, evidence from the biological 
sciences indicates that it has outlived its usefulness. Consequently, those wishing to teach students about 
genetics, human nature, inheritance, and development would be well advised to refrain from framing 
their discussions in terms of this obsolete dichotomy. 
 
Chapter 27 Genomics and Society: Why “Discovery” Matters  
Lisa Gannett 
Given the commercialized social context within which research in genomics is carried out, concerns have 
been raised about whether patent applications, consulting agreements, and reliance on industry grants 
serve to compromise the objectivity of scientists. Traditionally, philosophers of science have defended the 
objectivity of science against the intrusion of values from the social context by drawing several 
distinctions: one, between theory and practice, or basic and applied science; two, between the context of 
discovery and context of justification; and three, between facts and values. In this chapter, I review the 
various ways in which pragmatists, post-positivist, and feminist critics have challenged these distinctions, 
and conclude that it is values all the way down: theory is embedded in practice, discovery matters for 
justification, and facts and values are entangled. A case study that concerns the recent invention of the 
concept of biogeographical ancestry as a substitute for “race” in population genomics illustrates how the 
value-free ideal, for the reasons critics have identified, does not succeed in insulating research in 
genomics from the commercialized social context in which it is carried out. The chapter concludes by 
outlining some implications for the status of epistemology in philosophy of science and for biology 
education.    
 
Chapter 28 Philosophical Issues in Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Research  
Andrew Siegel  
There are few areas of scientific inquiry that have been as fraught with controversy as human pluripotent 
stem cell research.  This research has implicated issues in metaphysics, ethics, and political philosophy.  
The issues include, among others, the question of when a human life begins, the moral status of the 
human embryo, whether there is a moral distinction between creating embryos for research and creating 
them for reproductive ends, the ethics of creating human/non-human chimeras, and the challenge of 
constructing public policy in a pluralistic society in which there are opposing views about the ethics of 
the research.  It is important that stem cell biology education extend beyond an inquiry into the 
biological properties of stem cells and further address the philosophical questions that bear on the pursuit 
of research in the field.  This chapter provides an overview of these issues. 
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Chapter 29 Ethics in Biomedical Research and Practice  
Anya Plutynski  
Biomedical research raises a host of ethical questions of import to biology education. This chapter covers 
ethical questions “intrinsic” to the research: e.g., ethical proscriptions on what kinds of research may be 
conducted, as well as questions “extrinsic” to research: about which research is prioritized and why, how 
biomedical research is funded and related considerations of allocation and distributive justice.  Research 
ethics is the branch of biomedical ethics that concerns the responsible conduct of research – including, 
but not limited to: the ethical treatment of human and non-human subjects, avoiding conflicts of interest, 
the fair representation of authorship, and the scientist as a responsible member of society.  The first part 
of this chapter will focus more narrowly on the ethics of research on human and non-human subjects.  
After the Nazi "experiments" on vulnerable populations during WWII, the Nuremberg trials and Code 
that resulted (1947) codified a set of norms for research on human subjects necessary to protect 
vulnerable populations from abuse. Until relatively recently, vulnerable populations (prisoners, soldiers) 
were viewed as optimal candidates for biomedical research, and were invited to participate in medical 
research that posed serious harms and had very little benefit, often to them as patients, and sometimes to 
science, in general. The most famous example of this is the Tuskegee syphilis study, in which 400 
African-American men with untreated syphilis were left untreated and observed over the course of 
decades, even after treatment became available. With respect to the “extrinsic” issues, a variety of 
economists, philosophers, sociologists, and biomedical researchers have brought attention to the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of biomedical research is directed toward diseases that by and large affect the 
wealthy.  Whereas historically, biomedical research was often conducted in non-profit or government 
sector, a larger percentage of such research today is conducted in the private sector. This raises questions 
about potential conflicts of interest – e.g., concerning whether clinicians and clinician researchers are 
unduly influenced by profit in prioritizing some research projects over others, and, whether efficacy of 
new drugs or treatment regimes is exaggerated and risk minimized as a result. At the end of this chapter, 
several proposals for addressing these issues will be reviewed. Addressing these ethical issues is important 
to biology education, because students from a variety of disciplines need to situate biomedical research in 
social and ethical context, and reflect on its larger import. 
 
Chapter 30 Environmental Ethics  
Roberta Millstein 
A number of areas of biology raise questions about what is of value in the natural environment and how 
we ought to behave towards it: conservation biology, environmental science, and ecology, to name a few.  
Based on my experience teaching students from these and similar majors, I argue that the field of 
environmental ethics has much to teach these students.  They come to me with pent-up questions and a 
feeling that more is needed to fully engage in their subjects, and I believe some exposure to 
environmental ethics can help focus their interests and goals.  I identify three primary areas in which 
environmental ethics can contribute to their education.  The first is an examination of who (or what) 
should be considered to be part of our moral community (i.e., the community to whom we owe direct 
duties).  Is it humans only?  Or does it include all sentient life?  Or all life?  Or ecosystems considered 
holistically?  Often, readings implicitly assume one or more of these answers; the goal is to make the 
student more sensitive to these implicit claims and to get them to think about the different reasons that 
support them.  The second area, related to the first, is the application of the different answers concerning 
the extent of the ethical community to real environmental issues and problems. Students need to be 
aware of how the different answers concerning the moral community can imply conflicting answers for 
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how we should act in certain cases and to think about ways to move toward conflict resolution. The third 
area in which environmental ethics can contribute is a more conceptual one, focusing on central concepts 
such as biodiversity, sustainability, species, and ecosystems.  Exploring and evaluating various meanings 
of these terms will make students more reflective and thoughtful citizens and biologists, sensitive to the 
implications that different conceptual choices make. 
